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Abstract 
How can citizens of a moral community both be held accountable and be 
accountable for their actions and their character? What is the role of both the state and the 
citizen in restoring accountability? In this thesis, I apply Aristotle’s conception of virtue 
to Stephen Darwall and William Darwall’s mutual accountability framework for 
punishment. I present a theory of punishment that creates an obligation on both the state 
and the citizen to uphold virtue and be accountable, and posits rehabituation of character 
as a necessary component of maintaining mutual accountability. I then apply this theory 
to a paradigmatic case that allows us to consider on what grounds we can find relevant 
justification for punishment.  
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Preface 
As I write this thesis, the world seems to be collapsing before my eyes. COVID-
19 has spread throughout the world, and this global pandemic has only emphasized so 
many injustices and oppressions. While the disease itself does not discriminate, it is clear 
who will be most affected by the virus and the economic implications of it: the poor, the 
incarcerated, communities of color, those lacking access to healthcare, people 
experiencing homelessness who are unable to social distance, and more.  
I was compelled to write this thesis because I am interested in the many 
requirements of justice. Though individuals ought to hold themselves to account, the state 
also plays a profound role in creating the conditions of a just society that will allow for 
accountability. As we aim to hold ourselves and our fellow citizens responsible, we must 
also profoundly reckon with the role of the state in upholding justice.  
I hope this thesis provides interesting justification for punishment. I think a lot 
about the obligations we all hold to each other, and I encourage you to consider how you 
can hold yourself to mutual accountability. Rehabituation of character ought to be an 
ongoing process, and I encourage you to continue to challenge yourself and grow.  
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Virtue and Accountability 
In any moral community, we ought to have laws and commitments that the 
citizens of the community are expected to adhere to, and a system to arbitrate cases in 
which someone has breached these collective obligations. We hold both commitments 
and obligations, some that we choose to engage in, and others that we are simply 
mandated to abide by. We are bound both to obligations we have to each other, and the 
obligations our government has to us. Though all of us may aim to live virtuously, we can 
all fall short of this high ideal. For example, maybe I take $5 out of my friend’s wallet 
when I am in a pinch, and later apologize for this breach of trust and respect for private 
property. In this case, my apology would likely do the trick, leaving my friendship strong, 
with my friend knowing that they can continue to hold me accountable if I harm them in 
the future. However, in criminal cases, the state doesn’t simply arbitrate harm between 
actors, but rather, prosecutes and holds individuals accountable on behalf of the state. 
This is because criminal cases involve harms to the moral community. The moral 
community is the state in which all citizens live in accordance with laws and structures 
that guide moral obligations.  
 In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle outlines two conditions that must be met for 
society to be virtuous (Aristotle). First, individuals have a personal responsibility to 
habituate their character to align the apparent good with the actual good. Second, the state 
has an obligation to create the conditions in which citizens can act virtuously. Thus, the 
state ought to act as the body creating laws and holding citizens accountable to those laws 
in a moral community. Furthermore, the state ought to facilitate a citizen’s process of 
rehabituation so that citizens can regain equal standing within this moral community. 
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Virtue and the Self 
According to Aristotle, virtue and vice are within our power. Aristotle writes that 
just as our actions are of our own accord, “virtue is also up to us, and so also, in the same 
way, is vice” (37) Though ultimately in our control, the process of becoming virtuous 
requires accountability, both within ourselves and as carried out by the state.         
If I experience physical sickness, I cannot simply wish the sickness away, as 
much as I may want to. Similarly, moral sickness cannot simply be wished away. While 
before you are sick, you can actively work to better yourself to prevent sickness, once 
you have become ill, you must now take significant steps to rid yourself of such illness. 
Aristotle writes “it is unreasonable for someone doing injustice not to wish to be unjust, 
or for someone doing intemperate action not to wish to be intemperate. This does not 
mean, however, that if he is unjust and wishes to stop, he will thereby stop and be just” 
(38). Though self-reflection is necessary for ultimately engaging in the process of 
rehabituation, simply wishing for a change in character is insufficient.  
As someone cannot simply wish to rid themself of moral illness, it is necessary 
for individuals to go through a process of rehabituation to get to a state of proper moral 
standing (38). Furthermore, we ought to act in ways that promote virtue, and not simply 
in ways that are virtuous within themself. As our actions are a result of our character, we 
must guide our character to “aim at the apparent good” so that our actions are similarly 
virtuous (39). However, what may be the apparent good is not necessarily the actual 
good. Though we all aim at the good, sometimes what we aim at is only apparently good, 
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and so our aim misses the mark. This helps to explain why simply wishing to be just is 
not enough to actually be just.  
For example, in A Christmas Carol (Dickens), Ebeneezer Scrooge mistakes the 
apparent good for the actual good. In his pursuit of the good, he is fundamentally 
mistaken, and believes that it is wealth at all costs that will lead to a satisfying and good 
life. However, after being visited by phantoms who force him to see his life in a new 
light, Scrooge comes to realize he had maintained an impoverished understanding of 
virtue. While he had previously seen wealth and greed as the good, he comes to realize 
that the actual good is compassion, generosity, and kindness. The rehabituation of his 
character means that Scrooge does not simply understand virtue, but he also acts in 
accordance with it. Scrooge becomes generous and kind, and begins to give away his 
wealth and treat others with dignity in accordance with these principles. In this example, 
Scrooge is able to tease out the actual good from the apparent good when he is put in 
conditions that allow him to see this distinction for himself. Scrooge couldn’t simply 
desire to be different, but rather, he had to engage in this process of rehabituation so that 
his character would transform, and his actions would similarly become virtuous in line 
with his character.  
Furthermore, Scrooge wasn’t able to simply come to this realization alone. 
Rather, he needed guidance and intervention for him to understand that he had been 
misguided in his pursuit of the good. This can be a particularly weighty task for 
individuals who are unable to recognize the fundamental ways in which they have 
distorted ideas of right and wrong.  
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Virtue and the State 
 On an Aristotelian account, citizens have a moral obligation to align their 
character with the actual good so that their actions are virtuous, in line with their 
character. The state similarly has an obligation to promote virtue by creating the 
necessary conditions for citizens to be able to act virtuously. Aristotle argues that 
political science is of high aim as it seeks good both for the individual and for the 
community. Aristotle writes that “for even if the good is the same for a city as for an 
individual, still the good of the city is apparently a greater and more complete good to 
acquire and preserve” (Aristotle, 2). To allow citizens to act virtuously as members of a 
moral community, the state has an obligation to create the necessary conditions for 
individuals to act virtuously.  
 The state does not simply have an obligation to create the conditions for citizens 
to act virtuously, but also must hold citizens to account when they are no longer acting as 
virtuous members of the moral community. Scrooge, for instance, was able to act 
virtuously and as a contributing member of the moral community after his character 
underwent a process of rehabituation. For him to engage in this process, he needed the 
ghosts of Christmas past, present, and yet to come to awaken him to his moral failings. 
Similarly, the state ought to facilitate the process of habituation among its citizens, as 
well as help citizens to identify the need for rehabituation, so that citizens can act 
virtuously in line with their character. 
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Aristotle, Accountability, and Habituation 
Aristotle provides us with a rich account of what virtue is and how it ought to be 
achieved. Aristotle’s dual obligations -- both on the individual and on the state -- can 
provide meaningful insight in to how we might consider situations in which someone has 
committed a most egregious attack on the moral community.  
On Aristotle’s account, the state does not simply have an obligation to rehabituate 
those like Scrooge who have a deeply impoverished and misguided understanding of the 
good, but also to consistently promote virtue throughout the moral community by helping 
citizens become and act virtuously. The state does this by creating and upholding norms 
and standards for virtuous character and promotes this to the citizenship in a variety of 
ways. For instance, the state may carry out educational initiatives to instill knowledge 
and good character within its citizens. The state may demonstrate its values through 
initiatives for the public good, such as by ensuring that all citizens have basic necessities. 
The state can nudge citizens towards virtue by providing incentives for citizens to create 
and build community. In this way, the state can consistently encourage its citizens to 
practice reflection and rehabituation so that citizens can work to maintain a virtuous 
character.  
There are many breaches of the laws of a moral community that might not need 
the state to act in its role as a facilitator of habituation. For instance, someone might 
break a law of a moral community and immediately understand this breach to be morally 
wrong, and then take steps to rectify the harm incurred and the underlying character flaw 
that led to bad action without state intervention. In cases such as this, the law may not 
need to be enforced for individuals to hold themselves to account and to be accountable 
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for their actions. Or, there are some breaches of morality that while individuals ought to 
hold themselves to account for, we might think the state should have no role in 
legislating. For instance, if the state were to write laws punishing heartbreak, that would 
likely be a breach in personal autonomy, despite heartbreak being so incredibly painful. 
Thus, it is the most egregious of crimes that are attacks on our moral community and 
demonstrate a fundamental failure to be accountable that the state ought to step in and 
arbitrate.  
Aristotle helps us enrich how we might think about punishing the most 
fundamental failures of mutual accountability. These failures involve deep breaches to 
the ethical norms of the moral community. I will explain a mutual accountability 
framework of punishment, and then will explain how applying Aristotle’s ideas of virtue 
to mutual accountability provides a stronger account of, and justification for, punishment.  
 
Mutual Accountability Framework 
In Criminal Process as Mutual Accountability: Mass Incarceration, Carcerality, 
and Abolition, Stephen Darwall and William Darwall present a restorative framework to 
consider the state’s role in carrying out punishment (Darwall). This piece outlines what 
such a framework would actually look like, and how it might be carried out by the state. 
The laws of the state may not align with the necessary conditions for a moral community, 
which obviously creates a tension for individuals to hold themselves accountable to the 
laws of the state. Through a mutual accountability framework, we are able to see how the 
state might uphold and facilitate Aristotlian notions of virtue and accountability. 
Additionally, Aristotle’s account of virtue enriches Darwall and Darwall’s theory of 
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mutual accountability by providing an account of rehabituation as a necessary component 
of being mutually accountable.  
 
What is mutual accountability? 
Violations of the laws of the state are presupposed to be morally wrong, as laws 
should be in line with the values that the state strives to uphold in its citizens. Sometimes, 
laws legislate things that are bad in themselves, or mala in se. For example, the state 
ought to make illegal murder, rape and discrimination, as these crimes hold inherent 
moral wrongness. Other times, the state legislates in ways that make certain actions 
wrong, or mala prohibita, though these crimes do not naturally affect the rights or 
property of others. For instance, a country might legislate that you can only drive on one 
side of the road. Once the state has established this norm, it becomes immoral to drive on 
the other side of the road, as this would put the safety of others at risk. Whether laws are 
created mala in se or mala prohibita, they create standards and norms of a moral 
community.  
Criminal acts are considered not simply violations of an individual's rights, but a 
violation to the moral community. It is through a legal order that citizens can be treated 
as equals, as all citizens are subject to the same laws and arbitration of legal violations. 
There are moral obligations that all members of a moral community owe to each other, 
and thus, violations of the laws of a moral community create dysfunction. In criminal 
cases, the terms of respectful community existence are threatened, and those who are 
harmed have had their humanity discounted in a fundamental way. Thus, criminal law is 
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not adjudicated simply by the actors or on behalf of the victim, but by the state on behalf 
of the moral community, as every citizen's rights have been in some way violated.  
As laid out by Darwall and Darwall, mutual accountability helps to explain the 
justifiable grounds in which criminal process can be enacted, and why the state ought to 
carry out punishment (though I will later explain what punishment ought to actually look 
like) when laws of the state have been violated. Mutual accountability is a restorative 
perspective to punishment, and takes as given that all forms of accountability are 
fundamentally mutual, as one must be accountable to something.  
Mutual accountability must be carried out by a representative authority.  Further, 
“practices of criminal accountability must be able to be justified from a perspective that is 
representative of the moral community as equal moral persons” (190). Simply put, mutual 
accountability holds the requirement that the state can only be justified in law 
enforcement when it allows people to regain their standing in society as equals so that 
they can continue to be held mutually accountable to each other and within a moral 
community. 
Mutual accountability does not necessarily need to be carried out by the state. In 
many cases, such as civil cases, individuals can find methods without state intervention to 
bring accountability, harm-reduction, and forgiveness. However, criminal cases seem to 
necessitate state intervention, as breaches to the law are not simply upon an individual, 
but rather, violate the moral community to which all citizens have collective membership. 
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Justification for Mutual Accountability in Criminal Procedure 
 Darwall and Darwall lay out two conditions of this framework as enacted in 
criminal procedure. First, “criminal process should be conceived in terms of mutual 
accountability,” since all accountability is fundamentally mutual. Second, criminal 
accountability must be justifiable “from a perspective that is representative of the moral 
community as equal moral persons” (190). With these conditions, mutual accountability 
is conceived and justified by its ability to hold individuals in equal standing with each 
other. Violating the necessary norms of a moral community substantively disrespects not 
simply the law, but also the expectation that the victim of a crime will be treated as an 
equal under the law and among other citizens. Thus, mutual accountability does not 
necessitate that the violator is harmed, but rather, creates the requirement that 
accountability can only be achieved when the violator and the victim can continue to 
stand in equal relations as citizens under the law. 
Darwall and Darwall write that “part of holding the convicted accountable is to 
demand that they take responsibility for, and do their part to repair, the breach of trust 
their actions have occasioned” (193). In this way, the violator is both repairing harm done 
to the victim and establishing themself as citizens committed to the demands of the moral 
community.  
 
 
 
 
 
Rosin 15  
A New Theory of Punishment 
I have previously laid out Aristotle’s understanding of virtue, and the role that 
both the individual and the state play in upholding virtue. I have also laid out Darwall and 
Darwall’s mutual accountability framework for punishment. Applying Aristotle’s rich 
account of virtue to this mutual accountability framework of punishment helps us to see 
the role of punishment in the promotion of virtue as a means to facilitate mutual 
accountability. I will present a theory of punishment that combines Aristotle’s notion of 
virtue with a mutual accountability framework, which I believe paints a rich justification 
for why punishment might be necessary, and what that punishment might look like.  
There are many different theories for why we might punish someone who breaks 
a law. A retributivist argues that we should hold people accountable and responsible for 
their actions, and holding individuals to account means punishment, usually harsh 
punishment, as a consequence for the crime committed. A rehabilitationist argues that we 
should ‘fix’ individuals so that they can be accountable, and continue as citizens who can 
be just actors within the moral community. If we use Aristotle’s idea of human virtue and 
flourishing, we can see a richer account of why we might punish, which will affect which 
cases we will choose to use punishment at all, and the cases for which punishment might 
be entirely unnecessary. Furthermore, changing the justification for punishment will 
affect the kinds of punishments that ought to be used.  
 
Promoting Virtue 
Aristotle writes “we are by nature able to acquire them [the virtues], and we are 
completed through habit” (Aristotle, 18). Humans have the capacity to flourish and be 
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virtuous creatures, however, we all must cultivate that ability within ourselves. If we 
presuppose this as a basic truth, we are likely to see punishment dramatically differently. 
First, we ought to think that no bad action could fundamentally condemn a character. By 
recognizing the humanity of all, we might think that even the most egregious failures of 
character does not render someone unable to become a virtuous citizen. I am particularly 
compelled by Aristotle’s account of human virtue as applied to punishment because I 
think this is a beautiful vision through which to see humanity: that all individuals have 
the ability to flourish and act virtuously.  
Aristotle provides a compelling lens through which to look at mutual 
accountability because it recognizes the need for rehabituation in order to hold people 
to mutual accountability. Thus, personal rehabituation ought to be a fundamental 
component and outcome of punishment, as it will allow for individuals to be held in 
mutual accountability.  
Aristotle further provides such a rich lens through which to view mutual 
accountability because he recognizes the shared responsibility of the state and the 
individual. On this view, serious flaws of character require rehabituation so that actors 
can be restored to equal citizenship and held mutually accountable to each other. Thus, 
the state has a complex role to play: the necessary process of rehabituation might look 
different for different people, so how can the state facilitate rehabituation for each citizen 
when necessary? For example, while the phantoms were able to awaken Scrooge to his 
fundamental character flaws and allow him to begin the process of rehabituation, this 
same process might not work for others. Scrooge wasn’t prescribed an exact treatment for 
his lack of moral clarity, but rather, was given the necessary conditions that allowed him 
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to see his moral flaws and rehabituate his character. Thus, while Scrooge needed to 
himself take accountability for his actions, he also needed to be given the appropriate 
conditions for him to realize that he needed to rehabituate his character.  
 
The Theory 
By using Aristotelian notions of human flourishing, we can imagine a more rich 
picture of punishment that is fundamentally restorative. The state ought to restore people 
to virtue not simply so that their actions and character can be good, but to allow 
individuals to continue to be mutually accountable to each other. Furthermore, we can see 
how a restorative understanding of mutual accountability will be beneficial for the 
violator, the moral community, and the victim.  
On this account of punishment, justice requires that both the individual and the 
state uphold their commitments to accountability. Punishment is carried out for the 
purpose of ensuring that all individuals can be held in mutual accountability, which 
requires a process of rehabituation. This process of rehabituation aligns the apparent good 
with the actual good, so that citizens can act virtuously, and therefore can be productive 
members of a moral community in which all citizens are held in mutual accountability. 
This Theory commits to the notion that all people are fundamentally able to become 
virtuous. Therefore, it is the role of punishment to allow citizens to build a virtuous 
character.  
This Theory is distinct in that it 1) creates an obligation on both the state and the 
citizen in upholding virtue 2) posits rehabituation of character as a necessity for mutual 
accountability.  
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Responsibility of the Self 
Though we all aim at the apparent good, we can fail to recognize when the 
apparent good is misaligned with the actual good. Thus, recognition of wrongness is a 
fundamental component of rehabituation, as it allows us to realign our values so that our 
pursuit of the apparent good aligns with the actual good. On Aristotle’s account, 
rehabituation is a necessary process for this realignment. If we extend this to the 
framework for punishment presented by Darwall and Darwall, being held in society as 
mutually accountable actors requires individuals to create good character through the 
process of rehabituation. Theories of punishment ought to consider the rehabituation of 
character from failures of the self to act virtuously to be a central and necessary 
component of punishment, as it will allow for individuals to continue functioning within 
mutually accountability to each other.  
Furthermore, this Theory requires individuals to hold themselves to account, 
which is needed for the process of rehabituation. This means that individuals are seen as 
autonomous persons responsible both for their actions and their character. 
 
Responsibility of the State 
 While citizens must take responsibility for both their character and actions, the 
state needs to facilitate the conditions that allow individuals to do so. Thus, mutual 
accountability between citizens relies on an active role of the state to uphold these 
conditions of justice.  
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 In Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform, Tommie Shelby outlines the role 
of the state in creating both the conditions of justice as well as a criminal justice system 
that is fair. We might think of the role of the state in creating the necessary conditions for 
mutual accountability in this way. The state has a responsibility to create a criminal 
justice system that is free from entrenched biases and structural flaws that would lead to 
“arbitrary and uneven enforcement, wrongful convictions, unfair sentences” (Shelby, 
228) and more within the processes of legal enforcement. Shelby explains that a just 
criminal justice system is not enough if there are structural injustices within society, such 
as “unjustified economic inequality, widespread patterns of discrimination, and 
inadequate protections of basic liberties” (228). To create the conditions of mutual 
accountability, we might think the state is responsible for ensuring both a fair and 
impartial criminal justice system as well as a society free of systemic injustice. For 
individuals to be responsible for holding themselves to account, the state must uphold the 
conditions of justice.  
 
Harsh Treatment 
Fundamentally, punishment ought to be about being accountable, holding 
accountable, and restoring accountability. While harsh treatment may be a component of 
facilitating this accountability, this accountability could be met without harsh treatment. 
Harsh treatment, such as incarceration, may be necessary for an individual to be held to 
account or for the conditions of mutual accountability to be met. As previously stated, 
part of accountability is rehabituation of character so that we can continue to stand in 
mutual accountability.  For example, we sometimes put children in a time out so that they 
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can calm down and reflect on their behavior in order to improve their character. In this 
case, though the purpose of the punishment is the facilitation of rehabituation. Harsh 
treatment would only serve as a constituent component of punishment if the violator is 
unable and unwilling to be mutually accountable and harsh treatment, like incarceration, 
facilitates an individual taking accountability. In itself, harsh treatment does little to hold 
someone to account.  
 
Overcoming objection: Retribution 
Darwall and Darwall write that “a mutual accountability rationale differs, first, 
both from any notion of retaliation and from any purely retributivist view according to 
which a perpetrator deserves to be harmed proportionately to the harm they have caused 
others. Deserved suffering plays no essential role in mutual accountability” (Darwall 
192). As Darwall and Darwall point out, retributive justification for punishment is 
incongruent with mutual accountability because harming someone does nothing, in itself, 
to allow two actors to return to standing in mutual accountability. On a mutual 
accountability conception, harsh punishment doesn’t allow for the violator to hold 
themself to account “through the (likely painful) realization of the interpersonal 
significance of what they have done.” Further, “criminal processes of mutual 
accountability seek to enact and restore mutual respect for the dignity of all persons.”  
 To expand upon this through an Aristotlian lens, retribution fails to center the 
rehabituation of character as a central feature of punishment. As Arthur Ripstein explains 
of retribution in Equality, Responsibility, and the Law, “in the case of crimes...there is a 
strong and legitimate retributive sentiment, which demands that wrongdoers “pay” for 
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their deeds” (Ripstein, 133). However, this ‘payment’ of sorts isn’t made to the victim of 
the crime. A retributive justification for punishment argues that individuals should be 
punished because they caused harm. However, the Theory finds that punishment ought to 
be a mechanism that allows for the perpetrators of crime to hold themselves to account. A 
retributivist account overstates the role of the state in holding individuals accountable, 
and understates the extent to which individuals need to hold themselves to account. 
Citizens can be held in mutual accountability only when both the state and individual 
both uphold these responsibilities.  
 
Overcoming Objection: Rehabilitation 
A rehabilitationist perspect is insufficient justification for punishment because it 
posits individuals as things meant to be ‘fixed’ by the state rather than autonomous 
citizens who need to be accountable for their actions and their character. The state cannot 
simply ‘fix’ someone if an individual does not choose to go through the challenging yet 
necessary process of rehabituation to re-establish mutual accountability.  Though the state 
certainly has a profound role to play in creating the conditions of justice and facilitating 
the process of rehabituation, a rehabilitationist view overstates the extent to which the 
state plays a role in holding individuals to account for crime. 
On an Aristotlian account, individuals need to decide to participate in the process 
of rehabituation for one’s character to become more virtuous. As Aristotle wrote,  “it is 
unreasonable for someone doing injustice not to wish to be unjust, or for someone doing 
intemperate action not to wish to be intemperate.”1 As previously mentioned, individuals 
 
1 Pg 38 
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must go through the process of self-reflection needed to realign the apparent good with 
the actual good. This helps to explain why there is no prescriptive way for the state to 
rehabilitate a citizen, or restore them to virtue. While the state plays an important role in 
facilitating an individual’s journey to rehabituation, the state cannot simply rehabilitate a 
citizen without the citizen taking intentional efforts to rehabituate their character.  
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Case Study 
         In The Terrorist Attacks in Norway, July 22nd 2011, Some Kantian Reflections, 
Helga Varden presents a case study that can help us apply the Theory (Varden). Through 
this, we can see how Kantian ideas of universalization help to justify an Aristotelian 
conception of mutual accountability. Further, we can see that this framework of 
punishment provides richer rationale for why punishment ought to be enacted. Helga 
Varden teases out mental illness from moral illness and presents justification for 
punishment on Kantian grounds. While Varden provides interesting and helpful insight 
into distinctions of moral culpability, her conclusions would be benefited by a more 
restorative, Aristotelian approach.  
  
The case: ABB 
Varden presents a paradigmatic case in which to think about punishment: Anders 
Behring Breivik (referred to as ABB) carried out terrorist attacks in which 77 people 
were murdered and hundreds were injured in Norway. Such a tragic and awful act begs 
an important question: what do we do when someone has so fundamentally disrespected 
our moral order? The victim of ABB’s terrorism was not simply everyone physically 
harmed and those whose loved ones were harmed, but also, an assault on the moral 
community broadly.  
During the trial, ABB “showed no signs of regret, remorse, or any other emotions 
appropriate for the circumstances” (240). Varden writes that “not once was there reason 
to think that he understood, in the ordinary moral sense of the word, what he had done” 
(240). Two psychiatric reports disagreed over whether ABB suffered from paranoid 
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schizophrenia and delusion, and he was ultimately diagnosed with a Narcissistic 
Personality Disorder (NPD), which caused him to “struggle to experience the other-
directed emotions constitutive of being a person,” making him “more likely to fail in [his] 
efforts to develop full, healthy ethical character” (249). While NPD is a kind of mental 
illness, his aggressive and destructive behavior was not just a result of mental illness, but 
also, can be explained by moral illness.  
According to Varden, we can separate moral culpability of those who are 
mentally ill from those who are morally ill. Varden thinks that punishment cannot be 
carried out on those who are mentally ill, as those who are mentally ill lack the ability to 
self-correct mistaken beliefs about right and wrong. However, Varden presents a different 
explanation that might explain ABB’s actions: moral illness. ABB seems to 
fundamentally mistake the good and has an extremely perverse understanding of 
morality. Varden explains this as a moral illness, which she believes we can hold 
individuals accountable for, unlike in the case of mental illness. ABB’s sense of the good 
was so fundamentally warped that even when presented with compelling evidence to the 
contrary, he remained firm in his convictions about morality. Not only had ABB grossly 
misaligned the apparent good and the actual good, but he had acted on his malicious 
beliefs in a way that wronged other citizens and the moral community. On Varden’s 
account, those who suffer from moral illness have the necessary epistemic conditions to 
recognize their failure of character, yet refuse to do so. Thus, the state has a role to play 
in holding ABB accountable for his actions through the use of punishment.  
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Kant 
Using Kantian ethics, Varden provides an account for how and why ABB should 
be punished. Kant writes that “for all rational beings stand under the law that each of 
them is to treat itself and all others never merely as a means, but always at the same time 
as an end in itself” (Kant, 43). Varden applies this to the case of ABB, and writes that “it 
was so important to subject ABB to justice in the public court system...that behavior 
[respectful treatment] made it possible for us all to uphold our commitment to humanity 
and to interacting rightfully at all times...we upheld the humanity in him that he himself 
proved so utterly incapable of upholding.” In this way, the law is being upheld as 
universal, as ABB is being treated with the same respect that all others would be given 
under the law. By treating all citizens by the same rule of law, decisions can be found 
legitimate even if the verdict itself is disagreed upon.  
A Kantian framework provides a compelling account for treating everyone with 
equal respect under the law. Mutual accountability is fundamentally about universalizing 
the principles that allow us to live in equal relations to each other. For Kant, “the formula 
of an absolutely good will” is the “categorical imperative,” which follows as “act 
according to maxims that can at the same time have as their object themselves as 
universal laws of nature” (Kant, 49). This provides rich justification for the Theory; we 
will be held in mutual accountability if we act in ways that everyone can act in, and thus, 
we can hold these reciprocal and universal expectations for all. Thus, for punishment to 
be in line with the categorical imperative, it ought to be for the purpose of holding 
everyone as equal citizens under the law.  
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Varden wants to use Kant as justification for a very lengthy sentence of 
incarceration. As the Norweigan penal code allows for a 21-year sentence as the 
maximum punishment for any crime in a single trial (which is considered a life-sentence), 
this is the sentence ABB received. Varden concludes that this is a disgraceful punishment 
for ABB, as it suggests unequal respect for the lives of those killed by ABB and ABB 
himself. Varden writes that this punishment is “absurd,” because “ABB killed 77 people, 
and each killing becomes equivalent to 1/77th of 21 years, or 0.273 years or a little over 
three months, according to the current Norweigan Penal Code” (Varden 255). 
Varden is right: no prison sentence given to ABB could possibly “match the 
wrongdoing” that ABB has caused on so many. However, if we are to consider this 
dilemma using the Theory, we will see that this reciprocal property is simply a flawed 
way of justifying the use of punishment.  
 
‘Forvaring’ as Accountability 
Under the Theory of punishment, ABB would have to become a citizen who can 
stand in mutual accountability, which would require rehabituation of character. 
Unfortunately, ABB has demonstrated such a perverse misunderstanding of right and 
wrong, which has led to massive harm for citizens and the fabric of the moral community 
of which ABB is a part. ABB has demonstrated that he is unwilling to hold himself 
accountable and be accountable for his actions, and is currently unwilling to engage in 
what would be a necessary process of rehabituation for ABB to stand in mutual 
accountability with fellow citizens.  
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This begs an important question: can we hold individuals who have committed 
such egregious crimes to account? If yes, how can we do so? The Norweigan penal 
system has a clause known as ‘forvaring,’ (or, “safekeeping”) in which “a prisoner cannot 
be released unless psychiatrists deem him or her no longer a danger to society” (241). If 
ABB is morally ill and unable to understand that he has so profoundly misaligned the 
apparent good and actual good, he poses a threat to society, and thus his prison sentence 
could be extended beyond the maximum sentence given in Norway of 21 years. The 
‘forvaring’ clause provides justification for keeping ABB incarcerated for the rest of his 
life because his moral illness will prevent him from ever regaining equal standing within 
the moral community. If ABB fails to be accountable for his actions, he will never be 
able to live in mutual accountability with fellow citizens.  
‘Forvaring’ is used as justification to protect the moral community from those 
who will continue to cause harm when they are so fundamentally unable to align the 
apparent good with the actual good. In the case of ABB, Varden explains that the 
‘forvaring’ clause provides the necessary justification for incarcerating ABB for longer 
than the maximum sentence of 21 years, effectively giving ABB a true life sentence.  
 However, ‘forvaring’ should not simply be an alternative to punishment, but 
rather, a constituent component of punishment. In carrying out its role of enforcing the 
norms of the moral community, the state needs to ensure that all citizens are mutually 
accountable to each other. If ABB refuses and is unable to understand his fundamental 
flaws of character, and the need to hold himself accountable for his actions and 
rehabituate his character, the state needs to separate him from the moral community 
because he has not upheld his end of mutual accountability. Thus, ‘forvaring’ does not 
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simply need to act as justification for extending the sentence of ABB. ‘Forvaring’ 
provides the framework that the state should be using in determining punishment that 
incorporates the need for citizens to be accountable for their actions and their character, 
be held accountable, and to restore accountability.  
 On Kantian grounds, Varden defends a retributivist justification for punishment. 
Varden writes that ‘forvaring’ “should not be a replacement for punishment, the means 
by which we restore rightful relations. The category of ‘safekeeping’ addresses the moral 
illness involved, but cannot remedy an insufficiently retributive sentence that fails to 
express proper respect for the victims and their rights” (Varden, 257). Thus, she 
concludes that “the ‘forvaring’ clause and the prison sentence are two categories that do 
independent work” (257). I believe that the Theory provides more compelling 
justification for punishment as a means to restoring, as Varden puts it, “rightful relations” 
between citizens and showing respect for the rights of victims.  
Mutual accountability as justification for punishment allows us to create equality 
of persons as members of a moral community. Under the Theory, ABB would certainly 
be subject to punishment, as he has failed to be accountable, and thus needs to be held 
accountable for his actions. However, accountability ought to be much richer than simply 
throwing ABB in prison, and thus, should be justified on stronger grounds. ABB has 
failed to be accountable and has failed to act in equal standing to his fellow citizens, and 
has infringed on the rights of others in the most fundamental of ways. Acting in its role as 
moral arbitrator, the state has an obligation to facilitate ABB being accountable. If ABB 
is able to truly be accountable, this should, in principle, provide more to the victims than 
simply harming ABB would. The state should determine what being accountable looks 
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like in a way that would actually help bring justice to the victims and create mutual 
accountability. ABB should be held to this standard. 
‘Forvaring’ ought to be a constitutive component of punishment because it 
ensures that victims will receive “proper respect,” as Varden writes, for their harm by 
ensuring that only when all citizens of a moral community can stand in mutual 
accountability will punishment have performed its purpose. Furthermore, though Varden 
justifies harsh treatment on Kantian grounds, she is failing to treat ABB as an end in 
himself. Though ABB has fundamentally failed to be accountable, he still holds 
personhood. The Theory of punishment recognizes that we must respect the humanity of 
even those individuals who have committed the most egregious of sins, as all persons 
have the capacity to be virtuous. Respecting ABB as an autonomous person, in part, 
means holding him accountable for his actions and his character.  
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Conclusion 
I have presented a Theory of punishment in which punishment is used as a means 
to hold citizens of a moral community in mutual accountability, and thus situates 
rehabituation of character as a central component of punishment. On this account, there is 
responsibility on both the individual and the state to be accountable and to create the 
conditions necessary for justice. These are all seen as necessary features of accountability 
to uphold the standards and norms of the moral community.  
 However, this Theory is simply that - a theory. We live in a deeply complex 
world, and actually applying a theory such as this would be very complicated. The world 
we live in is filled with injustice and oppression - how can individuals hold themselves to 
account when the state has failed to uphold its end?  
 This Theory helps us to think about what is needed when the conditions of mutual 
accountability are not met. External conditions such as systemic injustice might make us 
fail to be mutually accountable. Internal conditions, such as mental illness and implicit 
bias, would alter our ability to stand in mutual accountability.   
 This Theory posits how punishment ought to be justified within a just society. 
Though we do not live in a just society, we can use this framework to think about how 
things should be, so we can get closer to justice. We can attempt to promote virtue in 
ourselves and in others so that we can live in mutual accountability, and similarly, the 
state can use this end as reasoning and justification for policy decisions.  
 I hope this theory might provide a helpful framework to consider current debates 
about the criminal justice system. For instance, let us consider the death penalty. As 
Aristotle wrote, “we are by nature able to acquire them [the virtues]” (Aristotle, 18). If 
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there is something inherent to personhood that allows us the capacity to acquire a 
virtuous character, we ought to think that no action can so fundamentally undermine 
personhood as to erase the ability for someone to become virtuous. Thus, the death 
penalty is not justifiable punishment as it fails to even allow an individual to become 
virtuous. Further, the death penalty fails to promote mutual accountability as it 
undermines the personhood of those who fall prey to it.  
 Ultimately, I believe this thesis illuminates how complicated justice can be. Both 
the state and the individual are responsible for being accountable and restoring 
accountability. Citizens standing in equal relations through mutual accountability is 
complicated by systemic injustice. Punishment ought to promote rehabituation in order 
for citizens to be mutually accountable, however, carrying out this sort of punishment 
would mean the fundamental reimagination of most current criminal justice systems. 
Promoting this end – of all citizens standing in mutual accountability – ought to be worth 
trying for.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rosin 32  
Works Cited 
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. 2nd ed., Hackett Publishing Company , 1999. Translated 
with Introduction, Notes, and Glossary, by Terence Irwin 
Darwall, Stephen, and William Darwall. “Criminal Process as Mutual Accountability: 
Mass Incarceration, Carcerality, and Abolition.” The Ethics of Policing & 
Imprisonment, edited by Molly Gardner and Michael Weber, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2019, pp. 187–212. 
Dickens, Charles. A Christmas Carol. Chapman & Hall, 1843. 
Ripstein, Arthur. Equality, Responsibility, and the Law. Cambridge University Press, 
2004. 
Shelby, Tommie. Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform. The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2018. 
Varden, Helga. “The Terrorist Attacks in Norway, July 22nd 2011 - Some Kantian 
Reflections - .” 2014. 
 
